The ontological status of iʿtibār (normative positing or conventional stipulation) in value judgments constitutes a foundational inquiry in metaethics. Examining the relationship between posited (iʿtibārī) judgments and value realism plays a decisive role in elucidating the underlying structure of moral values. This article proposes an innovative, realist reinterpretation of the role of iʿtibār within the normative judgments of the human sciences. Its primary objective is to identify the various modalities of positing and the structural principles governing them, demonstrating that iʿtibārī judgments—despite originating from mental construction and normative positing (jaʿl wa iʿtibār)—remain fully amenable to rational evaluation and objective adjudication grounded in moral realities.
The proposed account argues that the structure of values rests primarily upon four dimensions: (1) the matrix of human ends; (2) the traits and characteristics of the moral agent; (3) the objective realities shaping the context of action; and (4) the intrinsic features of the action itself. Through a critical analysis of four major paradigms in this domain—namely conventionalism, constructivism, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Theory of Iʿtibāriyyāt, and ʿAllāmah Miṣbāḥ Yazdī’s account of iʿtibār—this study develops a novel, multi-stage framework for understanding the role of positing in value theory.
Utilizing a descriptive-analytical methodology, the research identifies at least five distinct types of iʿtibār in value judgments, which serve as the foundation for articulating the structural principles of values: (1) compositional iʿtibār in real causes; (2) the iʿtibār of causality and causal efficacy; (3) relational iʿtibār; (4) the iʿtibār of unifying symbols; and (5) comprehensive composite iʿtibār. The findings demonstrate that all structural principles, along with the five stages of iʿtibār, can be rationally investigated, critiqued, affirmed, or rejected within a robust framework of value realism.
AhmadiAmin, A. (2026). Iʿtibār (Normative Positing) in Value Judgments: A Novel Realist Framework for Articulating the Structure of Values. New Theological Teachings, 5(2), 13-36. doi: 10.22034/ntt.2026.836
MLA
AhmadiAmin, A. . "Iʿtibār (Normative Positing) in Value Judgments: A Novel Realist Framework for Articulating the Structure of Values", New Theological Teachings, 5, 2, 2026, 13-36. doi: 10.22034/ntt.2026.836
HARVARD
AhmadiAmin, A. (2026). 'Iʿtibār (Normative Positing) in Value Judgments: A Novel Realist Framework for Articulating the Structure of Values', New Theological Teachings, 5(2), pp. 13-36. doi: 10.22034/ntt.2026.836
CHICAGO
A. AhmadiAmin, "Iʿtibār (Normative Positing) in Value Judgments: A Novel Realist Framework for Articulating the Structure of Values," New Theological Teachings, 5 2 (2026): 13-36, doi: 10.22034/ntt.2026.836
VANCOUVER
AhmadiAmin, A. Iʿtibār (Normative Positing) in Value Judgments: A Novel Realist Framework for Articulating the Structure of Values. New Theological Teachings, 2026; 5(2): 13-36. doi: 10.22034/ntt.2026.836
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